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DOROTHA M. BRADLEY* and HELEN M. INGRAM**

Science vs. the Grass Roots:
Representation in the Bureau of
Land Management
INTRODUCTION
There is practically a consensus among political activists and natural
resource scholars that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is flawed.
Neo-conservatives complained about the agency during the Carter administration. Environmentalists wring their hands over its actions under the
Reagan presidency. The scholarly literature provides a range of diagnosed
ills and prescriptions for improvement. This article offers a different and
more optimistic perspective which views BLM as grappling with broad
and enduring problems of political representation that cannot and perhaps
should not be solved. It focuses upon some fundamental issues of governance which contrast sharply with the narrower and more immediate
preoccupations of most of the agency's critics.
Much of the literature on the Bureau of Land Management bemoans
the agency's weaknesses and provides various recipes for survival,' The
lists of weaknesses usually include expressions of concern about agency
capture by clientele groups. For example, the livestock and mining industries have for so long been given favored treatment by BLM that it
sometimes has been derisively referred to as the Bureau of Livestock and
Mining. 2 Yet there are also difficulties for the BLM when it tries to build
a broadened base of general public support.3 Some critics cite BLM's
weak legal structure as a source of problems, noting that the agency only
very recently gained its own organic act, the Federal Land Policy and
*Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Political Science, The University of Arizona.
**Professor of Political Science, The University of Arizona.
1. J.N. CLARKE & D. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN: PowER DIFFERENTIALS AMONG NATURAL
RESOURCE AGENCIES (1985); George Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management (1981)
(draft paper prepared for Workshop on Political and Legal Aspects of Range Management, Teton
Village WY, Sept. 14-15, 1981); P. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS PoLITICS (1981); S.T. DANA & S.K.
FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY (2d ed. 1980); S.K. Fairfax, Coming of Age in the Bureau of
Land Management (1981) (paper prepared for Workshop on Political and Legal Aspects of Range
Management, Teton Village WY, Sept. 14-15, 1981); P. Foss, POLICS AND GRASS (1960); and
R.H. NELSON, Tim NEW RANGE WARS: ENVIRONMENTALISTS VERSUS CATTLEMEN FOR THE PUBLIC
RANGELANDS (1980).
2. There's More Rhetoric Than Reality in the West's 'Sagebrush Rebellion,' NAT'L J. 1928-31
(Nov. 17, 1979); S. DANA & S.K. FAIRFAX, supra note 1, at 344.

3. Robert McG. Cawley, The Sagebrush Rebellion 170 (Fall, 1981) (Ph.D. dissertation, Colorado
State University, Ft. Collins CO).
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Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).' In addition, Professors Clarke and
McCool have convincingly demonstrated BLM's weaknesses measured
in manpower levels and funding dollars compared to other natural resources agencies.'
Further, the lands BLM manages are residual, that is, lands no one
else wanted through the years even when they were free for the taking.6
Arid or semi-arid, these lands are often described as worn out by the
time BLM got them to manage. Problems also arise for BLM because
these lands are of low visibility and are often broken into piecemeal
parcels or intermingled with state and private lands. BLM lands, historically the unreserved and unappropriated public domain, are scattered
throughout the western states. Unlike the lands in national parks and
national forests, BLM lands are not neatly bounded or clearly labeled
and easily identified. Finally, critics see the BLM as weak professionally.
Compared with the Forest Service's very old forestry science, range
science is much less precise and well developed. 7
Recipes for survival of the BLM vary with which weakness or set of
weaknesses is seen as the more troubling or the most amenable to improvement. BLM is often exhorted to be more rational and/or to become
politically stronger. George Coggins argues that the Bureau's task is not
impossible but that improvement depends more on professionalism and
courage than on science or money.' Paul J. Culhane also sets the standard
of professionalization as a way for BLM to avoid capture and overcome
its political problems.'
Yet, these remedies are troublesome. There is little contemporary evidence to suggest that a strategy of increased professionalism and a broadened political base have elevated BLM from difficulty. The Bureau, like
other natural resource agencies, came under attack, especially by the
commodity interests and their allies, in the closing years of the Carter
administration as being unresponsive to grass roots interests. 0 This happened at a time when BLM had finally been given its own organic act
and had become increasingly professional. Yet although the BLM had a
broadened mission, increased professionalism, and a congressional mandate for greater public participation in agency decisionmaking, the Sagebrush Rebellion arose. In many respects, the Sagebrush Rebellion was a
4. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970); J.N.
CLARKE & D. McCOOL, supra note I at 111, 114; P. CULHANE, supra note 1, at 92-93; Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1976).
5. J.N. CLARKE & D. MCCOOL, supra note !, at 127, 137, 141.
6. Id. at 111.
7. Id. at 112; Fairfax, supra note 1, at 67.
8. G. Coggins, supra note 1, at 1-1.
9. P. CULHANE, supra note 1.
10. J.N. CLARKE & D. McCooL, supra note 1, at 116-17; see also Cawley, supra note 3.
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version of older conflicts which troubled BLM's predecessors, the General
Land Office (GLO) and the Taylor Grazing Service, and provides clear
evidence of considerable user dissatisfaction.
The election of Ronald Reagan, a self-proclaimed Sagebrush Rebel,
and his appointments of Rebels James Watt as Secretary of the Interior
and Robert Burford as Director of BLM did not end the controversies
surrounding the agency." As Paul Culhane notes, "[Watt's] unpopular
policies and his highly visible verbal pratfalls ultimately proved so intolerable as to elicit a Senate 'no confidence' motion." 2 Watt resigned
under pressure in October 1983. William P. Clark followed him and, in
turn, Donald P. Hodel replaced Clark. Although the change in personnel
quieted the public furor, few expected much change in fundamental policy
emphasis. Burford has retained his position but his policies are challenged
on numerous fronts. Grazing policies which purportedly have turned
public rangelands into desert, and highly controversial wilderness and
mineral leasing policies, are among the Burford policies most criticized.
For example, in April 1985 the National Wildlife Federation (NWF)
opposed the BLM's "withdrawal review program," charging that the
agency is opening sizeable portions of protected public lands to mining
and mineral leasing without following proper review procedures. 3 In
June 1985 Audubon Action reported that a government study shows that
overgrazing on public rangelands is turning 225 million acres into desert. 4
Conservationists now believe that the time is finally ripe for changing
BLM's long-standing grazing policies."
The persistence of BLM's problems with the grass roots suggests that
BLM is an agency that is not so much pursuing an incorrect strategy as
reflecting the enduring problems of governance. That democratic governments are supposed to act in the interests of their citizens is at the
heart of democratic theory. But public officials trying to implement this
ideal face knotty problems such as whether and when what citizens say
they want can be taken as true expressions of their interests, and what
representatives do when their "informed" judgment of citizens' interests
differs from citizens' views.
Questions of representation such as these seem particularly acute for
I1. Culhane, Sagebrush Rebels in Office: Jim Watt's Land and Water Politics in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN THE 1980s 293-94 (N. Vig & M. Kraft eds. 1984). Although Watt said he did not favor
massive transfers of federal lands to the states, a key item on the Rebellion agenda, he was wellknown for his association with the Sagebrush movement and Burford was an acknowledged leader
of it. See also J.N. CLARKE & D. MCCOOL, supra note 1, at 115-18.
12. Culhane, supra note 11, at 314.
13. 3 NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, Rush to Judgment on Our Public Lands, in CONSERVATION

85 1 (Apr. 1985).
14. Burstein, Cattle Making Desert of West, 3 AUDUBON ACTION, 3 (June 1985).
15. Id.
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natural resource agencies. As Samuel Hays has noted, the American
conservation movement of the Progressive era had as its ideal "maximum
development through scientific adjustment of competing uses."' 6 Attempts to implement this ideal, however ". . . required centralized and
coordinated decisions [and this] . . . conflicted with American political
institutions which drew their vitality from filling local needs."' 7 Furthermore, "this conflict between the centralizing tendencies of effective
economic organization and the decentralizing forces inherent in a multitude of geographical interests presented problems to challenge even the
wisest statesman. " 8 Hays concluded that the Theodore Roosevelt administration grappled with these problems but failed to resolve them. Since
the Roosevelt administration was essentially hostile to widely distributed
decisionmaking, its leaders chose to identify opposition to the administration as "selfish interests" rather than to recognize the paradoxes inherent in their own approach.' 9 Nevertheless, Samuel Hays noted:
...The conservation movement raised a fundamental question in
American life: How can large-scale economic development be effective and at the same time fulfill the desire for significant grass
roots participation? How can the technical requirements of an increasingly complex society be adjusted to the need for the expression
of partial and limited aims? This was the basic political problem
which a technological age, the spirit of which the conservation movement fully embodied, bequeathed to American society.2 °
There are no simple panaceas for overcoming the contradictions of
which Hays writes. Politics, it seems, is a persistent process of striking
balances under conditions of competition and stress. An analysis of the
BLM must reach beyond recipes for the survival of the agency to an
understanding of the conundrum of representation over which BLM must
continue to puzzle. The section that follows will examine how each of
the various meanings of representation taken individually, and related to
our concerns about BLM, is partial and unsatisfactory. Yet these conceptions and their associated directions to BLM are conflicting and contradictory when linked together. In the face of such contradictions and
conflicts, what help, if any, can the standard recipes for survival offer?
The third section addresses the oft-repeated strictures that the BLM should
become more rational and more powerful politically. The concluding
section suggests that the most useful contribution that scholars can make
16. S.P.
17.
18.
19.
20.

HAYES, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY

Id.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Id.

275 (1959).
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to the BLM is to admit there are no answers, only different configurations
of enduring puzzles. While this recommendation is not exactly a cure,
the message should not be discouraging to the BLM, for pains, according
to the physicians, are not symptoms of disease, but signs of life.
DIMENSIONS OF REPRESENTATION
In a democratic system of government the sources of power and the
limits set upon its exercise spring from the people. Political institutions,
that is those entities, including agencies in the executive branch, that
have a role in the governmental allocation of values among citizens,
should represent interests of citizens. Difficulties arise for these institutions because while the representation requirement is clear and unequivocal, there is no consensus among theorists who have written about the
meaning of the concept. According to Hanna Pitkin's brilliant analysis,
most scholars writing on representation fail because they attach themselves to a single facet of representation. 2 The concept of representation
is rather like an onion, and the theorist in search of essence can make
two mistakes. The first and most common mistake is to assume that one
or another layer is the whole. The second is to discard layer after layer
in search of the substance beneath the peels. Our approach is to continually
remind ourselves of the whole as we pursue each facet of representation.
As the discussion that follows concerning the BLM illustrates, meeting
the tests of representativeness along one dimension often simply raises
issues along another.
FormalisticRepresentation
The formalistic view of representation provides a good beginning for
discussion. As Thomas Hobbes long ago pointed out, a representative
stands for and must be able to act for another.22 At the basis of the
representational relationship is a contract that authorizes the representative
to act in the name of the represented. The emphasis of the formalist theory
is upon the beginning of the representational relationship, the conferring
of formal powers and the definition of powers. Hobbes would argue that
governors, to be representative, must have the power or authority to
govern. 23 Formalistic views of representation stress basic grants of power,
the authorization of representatives and the definition of legitimate powers. Formalistic approaches also concentrate on procedures for decision21. H.F. PrrKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 7-17 (1967).
22. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford ed. 1965).
23. Id. See also H. INGRAM, N. LANEY & J. MCCAIN, A POLICY APPROACH TO POLmCAL REPRESENTATION 7-8 (1980).
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making that specify how decisions are made and who participates in these
decisions. The formalistic view of representation skews in favor of the
representative. To the extent that the agent has been authorized to act and
follow specified procedures, the representation requirement is fulfilled. 24
The Bureau of Land Management provides an example of an attempt
to solve representational problems through a formalistic approach. BLM
officials once identified the lack of an organic act as a key to the agency's
weakness.' The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 granted
the agency a strong formal basis. FLPMA was: "truly landmark legislation. It provided for the first time a clear and coherent statement from
Congress on the administration of our Nation's public lands. . . . It set
policy and standards for the Bureau to plan, manage, and protect the
public lands and their resources." 26 Furthermore, for the first time FLPMA
formally declared it to be the policy of the United States that the public
lands should remain in federal ownership and should be managed under
the principles of balanced multiple use and sustained yield. 27 Earlier these
lands were held "pending disposition" and were administered on the basis
of more than 3,500
statutes dating largely from the disposition era of
28
public land policy.
Events following FLPMA's passage illustrate the limitations of formalistic approaches to representation. Clearly legal authority is an important basis of action, and action is essential for governance. However,
authority, although necessary, is not by itself sufficient. If, after all,
authority were coextensive with representation, all governments would
be representative and Nevada ranchers would have felt that their interests
were adequately represented under FLPMA. But they did not.
Nevada cattlemen holding grazing permits from BLM perceived a threat
to their interests and organized the beginnings of the Sagebrush Rebellion,
the movement to transfer ownership and control of public lands from
BLM to the states in which these lands are located. Nevada State Senator
Norm Glazer declared that Nevadans were ". . . tired of being pistolwhipped by the bureaucrats and dry-gulched by federal regulations. "29
The Sagebrush rebels even couched their public debate on formalistic
24. H.F. PIcIN, supra note 21, at 39.
25. S. DANA AND S.K. FAIRFAX, supra note 1, at 337-38; PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION,
supra note 4; J.N. CLARKE & D. MCCOOL, supra note 1, at 114. Cawley, supra note 3, at 124, notes
that the characterization of FLPMA as BLM's organic act is accurate. "An 'organic act' creates and
authorizes a new agency. Although the BLM was already in existence . . . it had never been given
specific legislative direction by Congress. Thus, FLPMA might be viewed as 'recreating' the BLM."
26. Implementation of the FederalLand Policy and ManagementAct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1979) (No. 9628, Pt. 1) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
27. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976)
28. See P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).
29. The Angry West vs. the Rest, 12-XCIV NEWSWEEK 38 (Sept. 17, 1979).
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grounds, declaring that state-level decisionmaking would more likely
represent their interests.
Indeed, state legislatures can claim to be formally more representative
than the United States Congress because both houses of state legislatures
must now follow the one man/one vote districting rules.3 ° However, the
gap between formal representation and actual representation is as evident
in regard to one man/one vote as it is in some interests' perception of
FLPMA. Proponents of court-ordered reapportionment previously had
argued that rural areas were overrepresented in state legislatures because
old legislative district lines did not reflect more recent population shifts
to the cities. But since the courts ended malapportionment, dramatic shifts
in policy favoring urban interests have not occurred. That these policy
shifts have not taken place is of interest in public lands policy because
many believe that the political stakes are greatest for these urban residents.
In the rapidly urbanizing western states, urban area residents stand to
lose the most by transfer of BLM land to state control; because public
access to these lands probably would be lost if the lands were to be
transferred to state ownership or sold to private developers. 3
One can also view formal representation as involving the formal procedures required for decisionmaking. FLPMA not only emphasized multiple use, it also required more rational decisionmaking processes and
mandated increased public and intergovernmental participation in these
decision processes. The regulations implementing FLPMA published during the Carter administration stated that: "the objective . . . is to improve
resource management decisions on public lands through a process of
resource management planning that includes participation by the public
and federal, state, and local governments, maximizing use of the best
available data, and analysis of alternatives." 3 2 In addition, the regulations
required that interdisciplinary approaches be used "to achieve integrated
consideration of physical, biological, economic, social and other sciences,
and the environmental design arts." 33 Critics have long described land
use planning in the Bureau of Land Management as particularistic and
irrational.34 Clearly the intent of FLPMA was to force BLM to become
more representative of a wider range of concerns by insisting on these
procedural requirements.
Once again, however, the limitations inherent in overreliance on formal
representation must be faced. Mandating legal requirements and proce30. H. INGRAM, N. LANEY & J. MCCAIN, supra note 23, at 5.
31. Bruce Babbitt, Veto Message, ARIZ. SENATE BILL 1012 (Apr. 8, 1980).
32. 43 C.F.R., § 1600 (1976).
33. Id.
34. Fairfax & Ingram, The United States Experience, in PROJECT APPRAISAL
38 (T. O'Riordan & W.R.D. Sewell eds. 1981).

AND POLICY REVIEW
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dures does not remove tough decisions from the political arena. Not only
has the Reagan administration revised regulations to restrict or eliminate
public participation in some programs, but it has often bypassed procedures for review.35 For example, "enormous areas of the West-some
160 million acres of federal lands-have been leased to oil interests with
no public review and with little environmental screening." 3 6 A fundamental problem continues to be that altering the process does not necessarily alter the substance of the outcome or insure a better decision.
A number of contemporary commentators have suggested a formal
modification of BLM's jurisdiction in an attempt to defuse the Sagebrush
problem.37 BLM's checkerboard pattern of land jurisdiction might be
consolidated by a series of land exchanges. Initially these exchange proposals aimed to reduce the number of BLM holdings mixed in with state
lands. More recently the land exchange scheme has been extended to
include an enormous land swap of about 35 million acres between the
Forest Service and BLM.38 The swap would transfer large areas of national
forest lands in Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming, as well as forested
areas in Colorado, Idaho, and Arizona, to BLM, ostensibly to consolidate
and reorganize fragmented federal holdings under a single agency's control. The Forest Service would acquire scattered BLM holdings and would
gain control over minerals under all its lands. 39 Advocates of the land
swap hope that authorization of a more coherent land base may lead to
sharper, more coherent representation. However helpful such consolidation may be, we caution against any expectation that the representation
puzzle can be so easily solved. There will continue to be value conflicts
about the management of BLM's land base however that land base is
established geographically.
These conflicts may even be sharpened if proposals to massively lease
or to sell off the public lands come to fruition.4" Influential members of
the Reagan administration clearly share an ideological commitment to
this privatization of public lands, but their "asset management" program,
a mandate to sell "surplus" federal lands, has not yet met with much
success. 4 The reasons for this lack of success appear to be political as
35. Culhane, supra note 11,at 296.
36. 3 NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 13, at 5.
37. F. GREGG, FEDERAL LAND TRANSFERS: THE CASE FOR A WESTWIDE PROGRAM BASED ON THE
FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT (1981).
38. Ring, Land Swap Might Affect Use of Much of West, Ariz. Daily Star, Mar. 24, 1985, at IB.
39. Id.
40. F. GREGG, supra note 37; M. CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED (1983); U.S. O.M.B.,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: MAJOR THEMES AND ADDITIONAL BUDGET DETAILS

F.Y. 1983 (Dept. ed. 1982).
41. Culhane, supra note 11, at 299.
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well as economic. Environmentalists and a wide spectrum of editorial
opinion tend to oppose the selling of substantial amounts of public lands
because they see these lands "not as a bundle of insufficiently profitable
commodities, but as an aesthetic and recreational heritage of every American citizen." 42 However, this constituency favoring privatization is sharply
divided. Some privatization advocates argue for sales at fair market value
to raise revenues and to reduce the federal debt. But Western ranchers
who depend on leasing these public rangelands fear being outbid and
argue that their operations are so economically marginal that they could
not afford the capital and property tax costs of fair market price." 3 Marion
Clawson has suggested long-term, large-scale leasing of federal lands to
private groups, individuals, or companies for preservation, conservation,
or commercial uses." How much this leasing alternative would differ in
practice from sales of the land is open to question. Clawson himself notes
that "BLM has in effect 'sold' much public land . . . when it entered
into long-term oil and gas leases. . . . When a lease finally expires, there
is little value remaining. . . .,,"

Descriptive Representation
A second way of looking at representation involves descriptive representation, often called mirroring. This model emphasizes an exact correspondence between the representative's characteristics and those of his
or her constituents. A representative institution, so the argument goes,
should "mirror" the people. It should be a reduced but detailed and
proportionate picture of the nation or of those for whom it makes decisions. Professor Luttbeg refers to this as the sharing model. 4 6 Advocates
of descriptive representation argue that representation is enhanced if representatives share demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnic
background, occupation, age, education, and socioeconomic status with
their constituents. Sharing such characteristics may increase the likelihood
that there will also be shared interests, experiences, and values. Advocates
believe that descriptive representation works in the following way: when
demographic characteristics are shared, representatives and their constituents will share societal values. To the extent that values are shared,
representatives, in choosing their own preferences, will coincidentally be
making decisions based on the opinions of their own constituents.
We have shown how formalistic representation could be construed to
42. Id.
43. Id. at 300.
44. M. CLAWSON, supra note 40, at 200-16.

45. Id. at 192-93.
46. N.R. LUtrrBEG, PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1968).
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favor the Sagebrush rebels. Descriptive representation also can be invoked
in their support. To promote more accurate mirroring, the Sagebrush
rebels can build a case for moving the decisionmaking arena for public
lands policy from the Congress and BLM to the state legislatures. State
legislatures can claim an advantage in meeting the requirements of descriptive as well as formal representation. Presumably the smaller the
geographic area and population size, the less the diversity and, therefore,
the easier it would be to match demographic characteristics, share societal
values, and achieve descriptive representation. The national legislature,
by contrast, may have a broader perspective and be less parochial than
state legislatures, but this very diversity would make descriptive representation more difficult to attain.
Interesting for descriptive representation, regional differences are seen
by some as the key to discontent with BLM decisions. A theme running
throughout the history of public lands conflicts as well as the Sagebrush
Rebellion has been that Easterners in Congress just do not understand or
appreciate Western differences. For example, coal mining regulations
designed for Appalachia are one among many of the Eastern notions cited
as inappropriate in the West. Presumably, the lack of shared experiences
between the regulators and the regulated has influenced such decisions
and has resulted in negative outcomes from the Western viewpoint.
Still, there is little agreement on how important descriptive representation actually is. Clearly, it seems to have symbolic importance. Individuals may well feel they are better represented if they can see that
decisions are being made by those with whom they share important characteristics. Yet perceptions seem to be as important as reality in this
regard. BLM and the Department of the Interior itself have reputations
for lacking a national perspective and for being too closely tied to Western
livestock and mining industry interests.47 Further, all major public land
legislation in the last eighty years has originated in Western-dominated
Congressional committees and has passed with Western support. 8 Culhane has pointed out that early statutes required higher-level Grazing
Service and later BLM managers to be residents of Western states and
gave hiring preference to those with practical range experience. 4" These
statutory requirements resulted in early employees being ranchers or ranchers'
sons. BLM later began hiring range management professionals but still
followed the Western residency rule. Even now, the line officers of BLM
are predominantly Western natural resource professionals-26 percent of
the BLM's managers are Utah State University graduates; 55 percent are
47. Fairfax & Ingram, supra note 34, at 38.
48. Hearings, supra note 26 at 11.
49. P. CULHANE, supra note 1, at 104.
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graduates from other Western universities. 0 As Utah State's Professor
Bernard Shanks notes, this hardly has been Eastern domination. 5 Nevertheless, there are many in the West who do not feel their interests have
been well represented even though Westerners have dominated both the
congressional committee that has made most of the policies for Western
lands and the agency (BLM) that has implemented these policies. Thus,
the Sagebrush controversy itself seems to reaffirm the idea that sharing
characteristics does not by itself insure satisfactory representation.
Substantive Representation
Representation, this analysis so far indicates, cannot be satisfactorily
divorced from the substance of representation. Is there a congruence
between the representative decisionmaker's attitudes and actions and the
concerns of those he or she represents? This question leads us to consider
the mandate/independence aspects of representation often discussed in
terms of the delegate or trustee roles for the representative.
Trustee theorists, exemplified by Edmund Burke, believe that the representative must act independently and use his or her own best judgment
to make policy decisions. 52 Those who share this view do not deny that
the representative ought to consult with constituents. They only deny that
the constituents should have the determining voice in the final decision.
Delegate theorists, by contrast, stress the popular mandate given a representative by those for whom he acts and his obligation to do what they
expect. In the delegate model, a representative should act only on behalf
of constituents' wishes, not on the basis of his or her own judgment.
Decisions should reflect the wishes of the majority, not one's own conscience. The arguments of both the trustee and the delegate theorists entail
problems and yet both seem partially right. Surely substantive representation cannot exist if the representative persistently ignores or opposes
his constituents needs, wishes, or welfare. And yet, how can representation occur if the representative is a mere puppet who takes no action
on his own but merely mirrors his constituents' views?
In some ways this dichotomy seems to lend emphasis to the tension
between the demands for increased public participation in governmental
decisionmaking and the insistence on increased professionalization of the
agency decisionmakers. On the other hand, this dichotomy also seems
to involve a distinction between immediate demands and long-term best
interests. In the recent public lands controversies, relatively small but
50. Bernard Shanks, The Sagebrush Rebellion as the New McCarthyism 12 (paper prepared for
the Contemporary Issues Lecture Series, Utah State University, Logan UT, April I, 1980).
51. Id.
52. Burke, The English Constitutional System in REPRESENTATrION 157-76 (H. Pitkin ed. 1969).
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vociferous interests with a direct economic stake in public lands decisions
have made their demands felt. The cattle and mining industries rebelled
against changes in their preferred status that resulted from the initial
implementation of the FLPMA which mandated balanced multiple use of
BLM lands. 3 Beginning with Nevada, several state legislatures responded
directly to the immediate demands of these interests by proposing transfer
of the BLM lands in each state to state ownership and control. 4 To some
extent this rebellion seems to provide a good example of delegate-type
representation as well as pointing out some of the problems inherent in
it.
One of the difficulties of the delegate model is that of accurately determining public opinion on an issue. Paul Burstein has suggested that
the most obvious way to see whether government is doing what the people
want it to do is to examine the results of public opinion polls to see
whether the results are reflected in public policy.55 However, often there
are no public opinion polls on particular issues. So sometimes opinion
is not known, sometimes it is sharply divided, and sometimes no opinion
has yet been developed. As in the recent BLM controversy, sometimes
intensity of public opinion by a minority tends to outweigh the opinion
of larger but more diffuse and less well-organized interests. For example,
in the "Rebellion" the cattlemen made their demands heard while most
urban residents may not even have realized that they had any interests at
stake.56
Unless an issue is salient or a consensus is clear, representatives can
seldom directly discover constituent opinion. Rather, they must rely on
a variety of cues which may be associated with certain issue areas. In
making policy decisions legislators are more likely than voters to impose
partisan or ideological frameworks on issues. Furthermore, a legislator's
belief that constituents might potentially care about an issue is more
crucial than actual citizen awareness in determining legislative behavior. 7
It may be that in the recent public lands controversy the quick and very
strong response of several state legislatures to the idea of transferring
lands from BLM management reflects these patterns. The transfer issue
was not equally salient to or intensely felt by all who may have had a
stake in the issue. Legislators may have had a false sense of consensus
since some environmental groups who later became actively opposed to
the proposed transfers were initially unaware of them. The legislators
53. Hearings, supra note 26, at 11.
54. Id.
55. Burstein, The Sociology of DemocraticPoliticsand Government, ANN. REV. SOC. 294 (1981).
56. Remarks by F. Gregg, Director, Bureau of Land Management, at the Intermountain Outdoor
Symposium (Butte, MT, May 15, 1980.
57. D.R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 69-72 (1974).
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may have thought that there was more citizen awareness or potential
concern than actually existed. They may have responded to the apparent
anti-government groundswell of national opinion. In addition the mining
and cattle industries have long held a favored place in the West and
Western state legislators may have responded to cues to protect these
industries as they had often done in the past. Finally, the legislators may
have viewed the controversy in ideological and partisan terms and responded accordingly. Thus, they may have seen the issue as traditionally
conservative-get the federal government off the backs of each state's
citizens, or as Republican--the Democrats in Washington must be stopped.
In sum, state legislators may have thought they were responding to
citizen demands and/or they may have been. One of the problems with
the issue of representation is that, as Paul Burstein notes, it is difficult
to find direct measures of demand. 8
A further problem, however, is that representation should include acting
in the interests of the represented as well as accurately mirroring their
views. Public decisionmakers cannot just do "what the people want" but
must play an active role in formulating ways of dealing with popular and
often contradictory demands in a complex political environment. 9 Thus,
effective representation must involve leadership. And this leadership must
inform and guide public opinion beyond the immediate demands of particular special interests toward a concern for the long-term interests of
all citizens, including those of future generations.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE CONFLICTS FOR THE BLM
In its struggle to find its representative role, the BLM faces at least
three inevitable sets of substantive conflicts. First, there is the conflict
between the increased expectations regarding government actions and the
growing get-the-government-off-our-backs syndrome. In BLM's case,
this dichotomy can be seen clearly in the conflict between the BLM's
mandate to improve public range conditions and the opposition to cutting
herd allotments on any particular piece of land. The roots of this conflict
run deep. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, for example, ended the period
of free access to the public domain and represents the first widespread
effort to manage, conserve, or improve the public domain lands. However,
in order to win approval for the passage of the Grazing Act, Secretary
of the Interior Harold Ickes struck bargains which continued over-grazing
for four more decades." ° Among his promises to stock owners were: that
there would be no extensive bureaucracy to regulate the use of public
58. Burstein, supra note 55, at 296.
59. Id. at 305.
60. S. DANA & S.K. FAIRFAX, supra note 1, at 144.
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lands; that fees for grazing would be tied to administration costs, not fair
market value; and that Interior could administer these lands for about
$150,000 annually compared to the Forest Service estimate of $1.5 to
$2 million. Thus Ickes ensured both low grazing fees and a weak collection and regulatory agency, while implicitly promising to protect and
revitalize the public domain lands. 6'
Even though the passage of FLPMA legally altered some of the constraints which had plagued the Grazing Service since its inception, the
Service's successor, the BLM, has continued to face contradictory expectations. Political imperatives have forced the agency to depend on
local support which was able to dictate demands in return for that support. 62 The agency has been trapped in a classic "catch-22" situation; as
far as the local constituency was concerned, the best thing the BLM could
do was nothing.6 3 Thus, in order to maximize political support, the agency
needed to minimize its activities, especially those designed to implement
grazing regulations. 4 Meanwhile range conditions, for which the agency
was legally responsible, worsened.
The second unavoidable substantive conflict faced by BLM involves
the historical contradiction between wise use and preservation which is
inherent in agencies with a conservation tradition. Samuel Hays has described the extent and seriousness of this split between conservationists
who favored resource development and the preservationists who preferred
preserving "trees and wildlife as objects of beauty, scientific curiosity,
and recreation."' 65 Symbolized in the East by the battle over whether or
not the New York Adirondack State Park was to be kept "forever wild"
and in the West by the fight to build the Hetch-Hetchy Reservoir in an
area of Yosemite National Park, this conflict splintered conservation organizations and left a bitter inheritance. Culhane places these natural
resources philosophies on a continuum from pure utilitarianism through
conservation (wise use), and modem environmentalism to romantic preservationism.66 He argues that contemporary public lands conflicts continue
to reflect the importance of these philosophies:
[t]he issues confronting the larger, multiple-use agencies, the BLM
and the Forest Service, are more controversial than those facing the
National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The last
two agencies are not free from controversy, but essentially preser61. Id. at 144, 160-61.
62. H. Ingram & D. McCool, The Relevance of Management Information Systems to Policy
Choices: Lessons for the Bureau of Land Management 35 (paper prepared for Workshop on Political
and Legal Aspects of Range Management, Teton Village WY, Sept. 14-15, 1981).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. S.HAYS, supra note 16, at 189-95.
66. P. CULHANE, supra note I, at 2-10.
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vationist land management missions insulate them from a whole
range of conflicts, since the proponents of various uses take widely67
divergent philosophical positions on natural resources management.
The third set of substantive conflicts which BLM cannot escape is that
between technocracy and participatory democracy. These are the contradictions which result from having to face pressures for greater reliance
on professionalism as a way to solve problems at the same time that
demands for public participation in decisionmaking have increased. Samuel Beer has traced the development of these two strains of thought.6 8
Beer notes that although the faith that science can transform society dates
back to the beginnings of the modem state, the "professional specialisms"
since the mid-1950s "have given technically and scientifically trained
people in government service a great and growing influence on the initiation and formation of public policy.,, 69 According to Beer, each profession sees itself as the proper body to define how some aspect of society,
nature, or life is thought of and to guide public policy concerning it. 7"
However, at the same time that scientific and technical expertise was
playing a larger role in conceiving and executing a wide spectrum of
public policies, a counterculture was developing.
Beer sees the counterculture of the sixties as reincarnating the romantic
impulse, an impulse . . . "as deeply rooted in modern culture as is the

faith in science. 7 The practical result of the countercultural development
was the addition of a new dimension to American attitudes toward selfgovernment. As Beer notes, the participatory democracy of the 1960s
was to give power to those directly affected by governmental policies.72
For example, there was the "notion that poor people are more objective
about their own predicament, that they are able to make simple, naive
pronouncements which are far closer to the truth than their more sophisticated but affluent neighbors. "73 However, nothing could have been more
antiscientific in method or antitechnocratic in spirit; the "case for participation rested as much on contempt for expertise as on faith in the poor."74
RECIPES FOR SURVIVAL
Faced with these three sets of irreconcilable conflicts, what recipes for
survival has BLM been offered? Primarily there are two: BLM should
67. Id. at 9-10.
68. Beer, In Search of a New Philosophy, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 18 (A. King
ed. 1979).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id. at 22.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 17.
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become more rational, more professional; and/or BLM should become a
stronger agency politically. These will be considered each in turn.
The idea that natural resource agencies should rely heavily on professional expertise to guide them toward more rational decisionmaking has
a long history. Its roots in the tradition of scientific management are deep
and long-lasting. Samuel P. Hays has traced the spirit of efficiency in
federal natural resource agencies back to the tenets of the conservation
movement. 75 The administration of Theodore Roosevelt was fired with
enthusiasm for centralized planning and for applying technology and
disinterested scientific expertise to the problems of natural resources exploitation and waste elimination. These early conservationists saw the
role of the agency professional as one of standing apart and above the
fray of narrow, competing, localized interests. By being apart and above,
the agency professional could exercise unbiased professional judgments
on the basis of scientific evidence. 76 Resource professionals were to exercise foresight and to make decisions that would reflect the most efficient
use of resources over the long term for the broadest range of interests.
Rather than turning to politics as a way to mediate conflict, experts were
to undertake scientific investigations and devise workable solutions. Having almost unlimited faith in applied science, Roosevelt repeatedly sought
the advice of experts in natural resources policy and then attempted to
apply this knowledge."
The legacy of this Progressive movement has resulted in an emphasis
on long-range, comprehensive planning and assessments in natural resource agencies.7 8 In recent years these long-standing practices have been
reinforced by laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)79 and FLPMA8 ° which encourage rational, goal-oriented planning. NEPA and the planning process spelled out in FLPMA provide the
authority for natural resource administrators to do what they would prefer
to do anyway: to specify and set priorities among goals, to comprehensively consider alternative ways to achieve these goals, and then to objectively choose the most efficient, effective, and least wasteful path.8"
Administrators favor this scientific/rational approach because it seems to
offer a way to avoid the deeply conflicting resource allocation questions
and to provide a way to understand and predict the complexities and
consequences of enormous, comprehensive resource policies.82 In this
75.
76.
77.
78.

S. HAYS, supra note 16, at 266.
Id. at 266-67.
Id.
See S. DANA & S.K. FAIRFAX, supra note I.

79.
80.
81.
82.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1970).
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
H. Ingram & D. McCool, supra note 62, at 4-5.
Id. at 6.
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regard FLPMA, like NEPA, can best be understood as part of the larger
administrative reform process which emphasizes planning and analysis,
rationality rather than policies.3 The statutory mandate for multiple use
and sustained yield together with the required planning process have
redesigned BLM's mission to parallel the larger movement to depoliticize
management through the use of scientific data information systems."
Computer systems now provide the means to store and analyze massive
amounts of scientifically collected information at relatively low costs.
Modern-day disciples of scientific management can act on convictions
which the early conservationists could only take on faith.85 It is little
wonder that "right answers" seem achievable.
Insistence on comprehensive, long-range, rational planning and management inherently assumes a highly professionalized agency. Therefore
some remedies suggested for BLM encourage it to become more professional. It is true that BLM's predecessor, the Grazing Service, began
with . . . "seventeen people on loan from the Geological Survey and the
GLO, plus two graziers pilfered from the Forest Service. . .[and] twenty
civil servants, most without range management experience or training. . . "" It is also true that later legislative actions required that hiring
preference be given to Western residents with practical range experience.
This resulted in early employees often being ranchers and sons of ranchers, not professionals trained in range management.87 However, even
though the agency continues to fight the "good old boy" image, the BLM
of the 1970s was considerably more professional than it had been even
ten years earlier.88 And by 1981, Paul Culhane could argue that the
educational background and the professional activity of the BLM managers and Forest Service line officers were comparable. BLM managers
may have less elan and esprit de corps than their Forest Service counterparts, but they are indistinguishable as professionally-trained resource
managers.89
Thus far, we have described BLM as an agency well on the way to
fulfilling the recommendations that it become more professional, and rely
more heavily on scientific, rational planning and management. Unfortunately, this nostrum will not work to solve BLM's problems. It will
not work for at least three reasons.
Part of the difficulty BLM faces is in the science. Sally Fairfax perhaps
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Fairfax & Ingram, supra note 34, at 29-31.
H. Ingram & D. McCool, supra note 62, at 28.
Id. at 6.
P. CULHANE, supra note 1, at 84-85.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
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overstates the case when she argues that "range science is not much. .. "'
But certainly it does not enjoy the long history and wide acceptance given
to forestry science. Furthermore, there is agreement that land or ecosystem
classification techniques remain primitive and fail to provide scientists
the capability to make fine distinctions.9 1 Due to the vastness of rangelands
and the tremendous variations in different sites, some even argue that
general guidelines are not possible, and that range management can only
be site-specific.92 Although there is not universal agreement on this view,
it emphasizes the tremendous variety of these lands as well as the element
they share. Rehabilitation efforts over the last forty yars have had limited
success in the face of previously damaged or destroyed native Western
ecosystems.
By 1976, a Council on Environmental Quality report indicated that
there had not yet been much research on range issues and what there had
been was often scant, disorganized, and based on narrow objectives.94
Major gaps in basic knowledge about rangeland biology were known to
exist.95 Fundamental information about how plants respond to grazing
was fragmented and incomplete.96 The picture in 1979 did not seem much
better. The concept of rangeland condition was described as in need of
rethinking. Both the data base and the ways of analyzing it were strongly
questioned. There was still concern that the biological response of rangelands to various management systems simply was not very well understood. Nelson concludes that the lack of a solid scientific foundation has
meant that BLM has been unable to provide definitive estimates for such
critical matters as the carrying capacity of the range or the likely forage
response to new grazing systems.97 The data most needed regards use
and response to use over time and this trend data is now available only
crudely and incompletely.
As a result, Sally Fairfax persuasively argues that BLM is not likely
to . . . "derive power from its scarce pertinent facts in the near future." 98
This is not only because the major data problem faced by BLM appears
irremediable, but also because, unlike the Department of Defense, BLM
does not have a monopoly on relevant information. Furthermore, BLM's
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Fairfax, supra note 1, at 67.
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Id.
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Id.
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information is hardly the stuff of which life-and-death decisions for the
nation are made.99
Not all of the problems BLM faces rest on uncertainties about the
quality and quantity. of range science, however. Part of the difficulty
involves the more and more widespread distrust of expertise. Ironically,
BLM seems to be coming of age as a professionalized agency just at the
time when distrust of expertise is rampant.
Samuel Beer has argued that both the technocratic and countercultural
strains of thought experienced a period of euphoria." But then each
"turned against initiatives it had itself inspired, giving shape to a wave
of distrust that is still powerful. . . .""'
Clearly this is an era of enormous suspicion about experts, particularly
about those at the federal level. The Reagan administration has seemed
to encourage and to act on this suspicion. For example, both the National
Park Service and the BLM's directorates have been reorganized to replace
professionals with non-professionals.'0 2 In addition, careerist BLM state
directors Robert Buffington of Idaho and James Ruch of California have
been fired.' 03
One useful explanation of this phenomenon of distrust may be that
provided by Hugh Heclo."3 " Heclo points to two possible factors which
may be involved: the growth in the sheer mass of governmental activity
and the related increase in expectations; and the development of "networks" of professionals that have influenced this growth. As he notes,
"people increasingly expect Washington to solve problems but not to get
in anyone's way in the process."'0 5 Furthermore, when the federal government does pursue activist policies, it provides strong incentives for
"groups to form around the differential effects of these policies."' 0 6 As
a result, there have developed specialized subcultures composed of highly
knowledgeable policy activists "who care deeply about a set of issues
and are determined to shape the fabric of public policy accordingly."' 7
More and more executive bureaucracy positions have been filled by
persons with specialized policy expertise rather than partisan political
99. Id.at 65-67.
100. Beer, supra note 68, at 17.
101. Id.
102. P. CULHANE, supra note 1,at 313.
103. Id.
104. Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 93 (A. King ed. 1979).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 96.
107. Id.at 105.
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affiliations.108 Many might find this situation ideal and, indeed, it does
present some advantages. More troubling, however, are the threats it
seems to pose. One threat concerns democratic legitimacy. Agency administrators may get so involved with one or another set among the myriad
policy activists that they lose sight of building support among the general
public. The problem is not one of an information gap. In fact, as Heclo
argues, "more communication from the issue networks tends to produce
an 'everything causes cancer' syndrome among ordinary citizens. "'" The
claims and counterclaims of policy experts incline the non-specialist to
believe nothing. The result has been that while the highly knowledgeable
have been playing a larger role in government policymaking, greater
numbers of the general public have concluded that those running the
government don't know what they are doing. "0
At least part of the problem with relying on expertise is the fact that
experts often do not agree. The scientific community shared, at least to
some extent, the Natural Resources Defense Council's (NRDC) misgivings about BLM's Challis environmental impact statement."' BLM's
proposals were described as seeming to be only one among a number of
potentially justifiable courses of action." 2 BLM itself recognized the need
for greater scientific consensus to be brought to light." 3 But the deeper
problem may be that there is no true scientific consensus given the current
state of knowledge." 4
Heclo adds a further dimension to this problem when he relates it to
concerns about governance. "' As he notes, part of the genius of democratic politics is finding nonviolent decision-rules to end debate. 6 But
the incentives in a policy technocracy are the opposite. Additional studies
and new findings can almost always be brought to bear and the biggest
rewards go to those who successfully challenge accepted wisdom.' Furthermore, since the goals of the issue networks are to achieve "right"
outcomes and since knowledgeable people can disagree about what these
are, finding agreement takes a back seat to one's understanding of an
issue. Bargains are suspect. Thus, there are few incentives for political
consensus and many rewards for informed skepticism." 8
108. Id. at 112-13.
109. Id. at 118.
110. Id. at 119.
111. R. NELSON, supra note 1, at 77.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Heclo, supra note 104, at 120-21.
116. Id. at 120.
117. Id.at 120-21.
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Even if BLM could professionalize, build a strong data base for rational
planning and come to scientific consensus, the agency's problems are not
solved. A major part of the difficulty BLM faces concerns the question
of value choices. Management of the public lands involves choices among
a variety of values as well as the application of scientific knowledge. As
Wildavsky has argued, "politics is about preferences. The point about
preferences is that they are not ultimately knowable, either by those who
profess them or by those who propose to act for those who prefer them"119
The dilemma faced by the early conservationists remains today. A way
must be found which allows democracy to coexist with rationality and
efficiency. No effective way has yet been found to depoliticize land use
choices. 2 ° As Sally Fairfax argues:
...the Bureau has fundamentally misunderstood the role of data
in conflict over range resources. They seem to believe that inadequate
data impugns their authority; better data will solidify it; and better
data, better science, and more expertise will somehow make their
decisions more acceptable. The Bureau seems to have missed the
basic point; the conflict is over allocations and outcomes .... 121
Far from it being an unquestionable good for an agency to act solely
on the basis of professional training and attitudes rather than to engage
in more political bargaining, this behavior may be dangerous. In BLM's
case, for example, it may well lead to the idea that the Bureau manages
grass, not people. R.W. Behan emphasizes this concern sharply when he
writes of the myth of the omnipotent forester. 122 According to him, young
foresters are imbued with the myth that what they must do is "have
enough guts to stand up and tell the public how [its] land should be
managed. As professional foresters, we know what's best for the land. "'23
Although Behan's approach may seem amusing when put in this way,
it clearly reflects the direction intended by reliance on professionalism
and expertise. Like the collection and analysis of vast quantities of data
by management information systems or reliance on efficiency or emphasis
on comprehensive rational planning "in the public interest," professionalism implies that there are available and attractive ways to avoid value
choices. Unfortunately, all policies are labeled by their proponents as
being in the public interest and most such arguments are plausible. This
is partly because they all reflect different views of representation.
119.
(1979).
120.
121.
122.
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If the calls to BLM to become more professional and to do more
comprehensive, rational planning prove an insufficient remedy, what about
the recommendation that urges the agency to become stronger politically?
Often this approach takes two forms. On the one hand, BLM sometimes
is urged to strengthen itself by improving its alliances with congressional
committees and subcommittees. This approach implies that dominant user
groups will be kept happy and encouraged to testify and lobby in Congress
on behalf of the agency. There are, however, problems. Any agency that
tries this remedy may find it almost impossible to avoid being captured
by its user groups. This situation is particularly difficult for BLM because
it has for so long been perceived as being "captured." It had only just
begun to shed the stigma of special interest domination when Secretary
of the Interior Jim Watt's policies again reinstated a privileged position
for the ranching and mining industries. Pragmatically, there is also serious
question as to whether such an approach can work. Most likely there are
now too many pressures from recreationists, environmentalists, and urban
interests for the old "iron triangles" to be very successful.
Watt's record as Secretary of the Interior seems to bear out these doubts.
Determined to break up Interior subgovernments, Watt retained or improved industry access while instructing both political appointees and
careerist Interior officials not to meet with environmental leaders or lobbyists. 24 Later this ban was extended to congressional committee staffers,
especially to those from the House Interior Committee.' 2 5 Additionally,
industry pressure was applied to Washington lobbyists and consulting
firms with environmentalist ties. 26 Yet Watt's rhetoric and tactics succeeded only in generating aggressive environmentalist counterattacks.' 2 7
Ultimately the Senate leadership predicted passage of a Sense-of-theSenate resolution demanding his dismissal and Watt resigned. 2 8 His resignation confirms that he had not built much congressional support despite
his preferential treatment of industry clientele. 2' 9
On the other hand, BLM sometimes is urged to reorganize and to
broaden its mission. This, it is argued, will enable the agency to broaden
its base of support by developing a wider variety of clientele groups. "'
In fact, the passage of FLPMA can be viewed as an attempt to implement
this approach. Unfortunately, it has brought BLM only partial success.
124. Culhane, supra note 11, at 296.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 297.
129. Id. at 296-97.
130. See P. Foss, supra note 1; P. CULHANE, supra note I at 89-93; J.N.
supra note I, at 111-12.
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While FLPMA's multiple-use mandate has insured BLM a diversified
constituency and a wider range of responsibilities, it has also brought its
own problems. Multiple use inevitably seems to be accompanied by
multiple values. While BLM is no longer at the mercy of a single dominant
constituency, it now must deal with a greater array of different value
conflicts.' 3' While BLM is no longer merely a temporary manager of
lands, it now has become a kind of court-of-claims, juggling numerous
conflicting ideas about land utilization. 132
Even if one ignores the responsibilities BLM has had for mineral leasing
on the entire public domain, the submerged resources on the Outer Continental Shelf and the timber on revested lands in Oregon and California,
the difficulties presented by multiple values are clear. Increasingly, on
the vast acreage of low elevation, arid lands which BLM administers,
non-grazing values are becoming more important. Pressures mount to
preserve the wilderness and aesthetic values, to develop the recreation
' Yet even managing the lands
potential, and to mine the strippable coal. 33
for their grazing values alone is not without conflict. Under the best of
circumstances, forage productivity is an uncertain business. As Sally
Fairfax concludes:
[a]llocating the extremely variable range resource among wildlife,
wild horses and burros, and domestic livestock ... is an extremely
difficult problem. The carrying capacity of most rangeland was allocated twenty to forty years before wildlife was even recognized as
a legitimate concern ... it will be an arduous process to bring all
the newly-authorized multiple uses into balance. 34
Besides multiple values, multiple use may also mean multiple vetoes.
Before FLPMA, BLM was required to respond to only a very narrow
range of interests.' 35 Now the BLM's task is much more complicated.
Planning has evolved into a systematic approach to conflict management
which stresses accommodation of all interests rather than the singleminded pursuit of efficiency.' 36 While this makes it easier for the agency
to make negative decisions, to decide what not to do, it makes positive
action-oriented decisions far more difficult to achieve.' 37 Thus, "[w]hat
seems to be emerging .. .is a system of multiple vetoes over positive
agency decisions. . . .While decisions that survive the planning process
131. H. Ingram & D. McCool, supra note 62, at 35-36.
132. Id.at 31.
133. S.DANA & S.K. FAIRFAX, supra note 1,at 342-45; J.N. CLARKE & D. McCOOL, supra note
1,at 113, 118, 122.
134. S. DANA & S.K. FAIRFAX, supra note 1,at 342.
135. H. Ingram & D. McCool, supra note 62, at 37.
136. Id.
137. Id.at 32.
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may be implementable, not many positive initiatives may actually survive ... ""'
Ifpositive actions are kept at a minimum, constituency groups may
become alienated, believing that the frustration of their goals resulted
from collusion between BLM and other competing interests. Culhane has
noted that for the BLM, the capture thesis persisted despite increased
professionalism and multiple clientelism. 39
' Neutral observers may have
seen the Bureau in the middle of a polarized, unidimensional policy
continuum. But when environmentalists looked right, they saw the BLM
aligned with consumptive users; and when the users looked left, they saw
the Bureau aligned with the environmentalists. " Among the participants,
only BLM personnel knew they were in the middle.'4 ' No wonder the
BLM always seemed to represent "the other guy."
As noted earlier, partly in an effort to reduce the influence of environmentalists on local policymaking, regulations were revised during the
Watt years in ways that have restricted or eliminated public participation
in certain programs. 42 But even when agencies have made good faith
efforts to provide for widespread public participation, the results are not
always that representation is taking place. In the complex, multi-objective
planning processes that have been developed to pursue rational choice
and to satisfy the requirements of fairness, decisions are remote from
articulation of demand. As public demands proliferate and compete, no
one should expect that conflict can be prevented or even kept from growing. Whatever it tries, BLM will find itself . . . "part of a confusing
policy arena, increasingly controversial, increasingly politicized, increasingly uncertain.""'
CONCLUSION
Representation is a puzzle; not the answer to the puzzle, but the puzzle
itself. Like a labyrinth, its meaning is found in working through the
possibilities to find the better options and repetition of patterns discovered
to be most satisfactory. Hanna Pitkin argues that representation, when it
occurs, emerges through tensions and contradictions.'" We have argued
that the problem for the BLM, and to some degree for the other natural
resource agencies, involves questions of representation. It follows that
138.
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difficulties are inevitable and solutions are bound to be partial and transient. BLM should stop seeking and analysts should quit offering quick
fixes. Constraints can be put on the representatives (agency decisionmakers) and efforts can be made to move the represented along (provide
leadership and build support among various clienteles). However, there
is simply no way for the agency to buy out of continuous, profound
conflict.
Formal representation, as we have discovered, is a necessary but insufficient condition of representation. The represented must have a representative, an agent authorized to act. It is also important to specify
procedures that delineate for both represented and representative the agreedupon manner for making decisions. However, as the history of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act illustrates, there can be a considerable
gap between formal authority and constituency acceptance of its exercise.
Sagebrush rebels have rejected BLM's formal representativeness and have
viewed state governments as more legitimate and accurate expressions
of their interests. Changes in the BLM organic act and alterations of its
geographical jurisdiction may be in order, but they should not be viewed
as solutions.
Similarly, symbolic representation is important, and it is possible that
representatives whose social characteristics are very different from their
constituents will find it more difficult to empathize with constituent references and will have a more difficult time being accepted. Yet it is difficult
to identify which social characteristics are most important to mirror. BLM
illustrates that recruiting personnel from the Western ranching community
has not purchased much support. And neither putting environmentalists
in high Interior positions as Carter did, nor removing them as Reagan
did, can be counted upon to quell agency criticism.
Substantive representation, that is, acting in the interests of the represented, seems to come closer to the heart of the matter. Tensions arise
here, too, for it is not clear what can be taken as citizens' real interests.
There may be real differences between short-term, immediate reactions,
and long-term, considered judgments. Further, the cues that representatives get from constituents may not be accurate reflections of preferences.
In our view, the usual recipes for survival, such as greater professionalism
and building political support by enlarging constituencies, are not especially helpful. Professionalism may simply increase the differences between the represented and the agency, and diversifying constituencies
may result in effectively vetoing any action.
That there are no solutions may be taken as a pessimistic conclusion.
We hope not, and in fact believe that the message is more encouraging
to the BLM than yet another recipe for doing better, which implies that
the agency has been doing poorly. In fact, the history of the Bureau of
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Land Management is not a cause for disappointment, particularly when
viewed from the criteria of representation. The nation has been profoundly
at odds with itself about the handling of public lands. The agency has
served as an arena through which this conflictive issue has been addressed
and, despite continual threats, it has survived. More importantly, large
amounts of land have been left in the public domain, making it possible
to continue the debate about what should be done with these lands.
Proposals to change the BLM should be evaluated as to whether they
facilitate or impede the dialogue of representation. By necessity the process is political, with heavy emphasis on bargaining and compromise.
Procedures that reduce flexibility and make it more difficult to identify
and correct mistakes should be avoided. For instance, large-scale, computerized information systems, and ten-year planning processes with enormous sunk costs are inappropriate for the BLM. Extreme policy actions,
such as ceding control of large segments of the public lands to user groups,
cannot be justified as representative of public preferences. No consensus
exists to undertake such actions, and extreme policy changes in any
direction have a polarizing effect damaging to dialogue. For BLM, moderation and incremental changes are advisable. This is not to say that the
appropriate role for the BLM is passive. It is obligated to portray in sharp
relief the long-term consequences of different choices upon the public
lands. Such leadership should not substitute professional judgment for
what are really matters of deeply conflicting values. Conflict is not a sign
that BLM is failing. BLM's existence, although fraught with disagreement
and stress, is not pathology, but politics.

